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Manifestos, Salience  
And 
Junior Ministerial Appointments 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We build on previous theories of junior minister allocation and coalition oversight by 
incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues covered in party manifestos. We 
argue that parties use junior ministerial appointments to oversee their coalition partners on 
portfolios that correspond to issues emphasized by the parties¶DFWLYLVWV when the coalition 
SDUWQHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHVGHYLDWHIURPWKHSDUW\¶V.  The findings, based on a data set of more than 
2800 party portfolio dyads in ten countries, show significant support for these expectations.  We 
find that party leaders that successfully negotiate for junior ministers to particular portfolios are 
most concerned about checking ideologically contentious coalition partners in areas of concern 
to activists.  The results also illustrate the usefulness of our dyadic approach for the study of 
junior minister allocation.  
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Introduction 
Much research on government formation has focused on the allocation of ministerial 
portfolios. Increasing attention has been devoted to junior ministerial appointments: especially as 
a means for FRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVWRFRQVWUDLQHDFKRWKHU¶VDFWLRQVMershon, 2001b; Thies, 2001; 
Giannetti and Laver, 2005; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011).  There has been mixed evidence in 
VXSSRUWRI7KLHV¶DUJXPHQWWKDWFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVXVHMXQLRUministerial appointments as 
an oversight mechanism.  Giannetti and Laver (2005) found that junior ministers in the Prodi 
government following the 1996 election in Italy had limited influence over policy outcomes.  
Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011) however, found that ideological disagreements between coalition 
partners largely drive junior ministerial appointments suggesting an important policy dimension.   
We build on that work by incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues 
covered in party manifestos.  We argue that parties will be more likely to use junior ministerial 
appointments for oversight purposes in portfolios that correspond to issues important to intra-
party groups and SDUWLHV¶ activists. We add that parties use junior ministers on predominantly 
activist issues when there is disagreement between the SDUW\¶V preferences and the party holding 
the ministry. Previous large-N studies of junior minister allocation limit their analysis to the 
characteristics of the party that controls a minister or to broader characteristics of the coalition.  
/LNH%नFN et al. (2011), we use a dyadic, approach that allows us to study the characteristics of 
each coalition party in relation to each portfolio. This approach allows us to directly account for 
both the salience of issues parties include in their platforms and the electoral strategies that led 
parties to include those issues. Our findings, based on a data set of more than 2822 party, 
portfolio dyad observations from 125 coalitions in ten countries, show significant support for 
these expectations.  
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Junior Ministers and Parties 
The literature on making and breaking governments devotes considerable attention to 
ministerial portfolios.  Much of this literature focusses on the distribution of cabinet posts among 
coalition partners (e.g. Warwick and Drukman, 2001; Proksch and Slapin, 2006; Carroll and 
Cox, 2007; Bäck et al., 2011) or among factions within parties (Mershon, 2001a, 2001b).  The 
presumed motive for winning a portfolio is the value of holding the ministerial position per se.  
While policy salience is often an important factor in these analyses, the use of junior ministerial 
appointments as a means of monitoring coalition partners is not a primary focus. 
Additional research focuses on the durability and termination of coalitions (Strøm et al., 
1994; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Martin and Vanberg, 2003; Timmermans, 2006).  This literature 
raised important questions about the nature of delegation within parliamentary systems.  This 
research instead focused on accountability within parliamentary governments and the means by 
which coalition SDUWLHVRYHUVHHHDFKRWKHU¶VDFWLons within the ministries (Strøm, 2000; Thies, 
2001; Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2005; Giannetti and Laver, 2005; Kim and Loewenberg, 2005).  
One of the most prominent oversight mechanisms discussed in this literature is the use of junior 
ministerial appointments by coalition SDUWLHVWR³NHHSWDEV´RUDFWDV³ZDWFKGRJV´RYHUWKHLU
partners (Thies, 2001; Falcó-Gimeno, 2012).   
 ,QWKHRULJLQDO³NHHSLQJWDEV´DUJXPHQW7KLHVDUJXHVWKDWZKHQ3DUW\$ZDQWVWRNQRZ
how a minister from Party B is managing a particular ministry, Party A will appoint one of their 
own as a junior minister to act as a watchdog.  This logic is similar to fire alarm oversight.  In the 
³NHHSLQJWDEV´VFHQDULRDQGWKHILUHDODUPRYHUVLJKWVWRU\WKHJRDOLV to provide information 
DERXWWKHDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRU,QNHHSLQJZLWKthis logic, a watchdog with dissimilar preferences to 
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the agent being watched will have the greatest incentive to report any attempt by the minister to 
deviate from the agreed upon policy.  Consistent with this perspective, Lipsmeyer and Pierce 
(2011) found that junior ministers tend to be ideologically dissimilar from their corresponding 
ministers.   
Although they enjoy less publicity and attention than ministers do, junior ministers have 
the potential to affect coalition governance. Much of the research on junior ministers presumes 
that parties primarily use  them for policy seeking motives and that they have an impact on 
policy (Thies, 2001; Mershon, 2001a, 2001b; Giannetti and Laver, 2005; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 
2011).  However, most research predicts junior minister allocation without fully considering the 
policy goals of the coalition members.  We contend that understanding junior ministerial 
appointments requires first exploring SDUWLHV¶policy goals.   
Studies of electoral strategy have long focused on ideology as a tool to attract voters 
(Downs, 1957).  Parties also use the issues in their platforms to strategically emphasize some 
topics (Petrocik, 1996) or to engage in issue entrepreneurship to attract new voters (Meguid, 
2007; Ezrow, 2008; Ezrow et al., 2011; Spoon, 2011; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012) even if the 
electoral gains lag policy change by some time (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). Indeed, 
governing parties sometimes adopt extreme positions to attract voters (Bawn and Somer-Topcu, 
2012).1 Parties are freer to change positions on some issues more than others (Tavits, 2007) and 
avoid discussing issues on which their supporters are divided (Wardt, 2012).  Governing parties 
are more likely to change the issues in their campaigns than opposition parties (Schumacher, de 
Vries and Vis, 2013). We expect that parties add issues to their platform to expand the scope of 
conflict and mobilize otherwise uninterested voters. The ORJLFLVEDVHGRQ6FKDWWVFKQHLGHU¶V
(1960) perspective in which political actors expand the scope of conflict by bringing up new 
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issues to mobilize supporters. However, intra-party groups and policy reputations offer 
incentives for parties to focus on a smaller number of important issues because party leaders rely 
on the support of party factions (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Harmel and Tan, 2003; Ceron, 2012). 
Likewise, parties face difficulties changing their reputation with voters from one set of issues to 
another because of long standing constituencies and governing history. Electoral constraints and 
policy reputations therefore influence the range of issues on which parties can credibly campaign 
(Tavits, 2007; Green, 2011; Green and Jennings, 2011).  
Building on this perspective, we expect that parties increase the number of issues in their 
platforms to attract voters, but reduce the number of issues in their platforms to mobilize party 
activists and emphasize their traditional competencies. Parties choose between each strategy as 
they pursue a focused or broad electoral appeal (Green, 2011). Both strategies seek to maximize 
vote shares, but follow alternate logics dependent on electoral context. Parties focus on their 
µRZQHG¶LVVXHVRUWKRVHIRUZKLFKWKH\DUHKLVWRULFDOO\NQRZQWRUHEXLOGDUHSXWDWLRQIRU
competence (Green, 2011). By decreasing the number of issues, parties focus their platform on 
the issues for which they have and seek to emphasize a reputation of competence as well as 
RXWOLQHPRUHGHWDLOHGSROLF\JRDOVRQWKRVHLVVXHV*UHHQDQG-HQQLQJV+RZHYHUSDUWLHV¶
limit the detail or specificity of their policy statements as they add new, less traditionally 
important issues (Rovny, 2011; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Parties perceived as more popular 
are freer to campaign on a wider range of issues (Green, 2011). Therefore, when party leaders 
add issues to their platforms they broaden the scope of the platform to attract voters. Conversely, 
when leaders reduce the number of issues, they narrow the platform¶V focus to their traditional 
issues linked to their historical constituencies (Green, 2011).  This leads us to describe issues 
added to attract electoral support as voter issues. We label issues on which parties have a long 
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term reputation and that the party focuses on to mobilize their historical constituencies as activist 
issues.2 Activist issues are those issues that parties have emphasized for long periods of time, 
that they retain in their platforms even when they narrow their scope, and which motivate 
activists within the party upon which the party depends for smooth functioning. Voter issues are 
those which parties recently added, that the party is less specific about and which the most 
established and long standing party activists have little concern.   
 Party leaders decrease the number of issues in the platform in response to electoral losses 
and policy failures. These losses create the perception within the party that their previous 
pragmatic strategies have failed.  However, party leaders discuss a broader range of issues when 
the party has had previous electoral successes or controls government. For example, the French 
Parti Socialiste (PS) increased the number of issues they campaigned on to attract voters prior to 
their 1993 election because of their previous electoral success and experience in office. In 1997, 
the PS decreased the number of issues WRPRELOL]HWKHSDUW\¶VEDVHand emphasize their 
competencies after their electoral losses in the previous election. Therefore, issues that the PS 
added to their platforms or increased in emphasis in 1993 were intended to pragmatically attract 
voter groups, whereas the issues that the PS increased in emphasis in 1997 were core issues 
linked to intra-party groups. In addition, those issues that the party decreases in emphasis as it 
changes the total number of issues in the platform provide LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHSDUW\¶V
principals. In 1993, the PS watered down its policy focus or decreased the percentage of the 
platform dedicated to issues important to intra-party groups as it added new issues to attract 
voters. However, as the party narrowed its platform to a smaller number of intra-party policy 
goals in 1997, they removed or de-emphasized issues that had been included to attract voters in 
the previous election.  
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:HH[SHFWWKDWSDUWLHV¶HQJDJHLQPRUHSROLF\VHHNLQJEHKDYLRUVin government on activist 
LVVXHVEHFDXVHRIWKHLUORQJWHUPLPSRUWDQFHWRWKHSDUWLHV¶KLVWRULFDO policy reputations, 
constituencies and activists.3 Like studies of party policy change (Tavits, 2007), we predict that 
parties act consistently on issues important to these groups for fear of appearing unprincipled. 
Coalition formation is one of the most important arenas for policy seeking behavior in 
parliamentary democracies. Because policies are largely formed and implemented in the 
ministries, the ministers assigned to the various coalition parties have substantial policy 
implications.  One might argue that ministerial positions are high profile symbols and that policy 
matters are only part of their role.  However, junior ministers are not as much in the public eye as 
ministers.  For example, newspaper accounts of new coalition governments report the names and 
party affiliations of the ministers but rarely report such detail about the junior ministers.  
)XUWKHUPRUHIROORZLQJUHFHQWUHVHDUFKRQ³ZDWFKGRJMXQLor ministers,´Ze argue that these are 
policy management positions (Mershon, 2001b; Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Falcó-
Gimeno, 2012). They do not have the symbolic status of being responsible for some policy 
portfolio, but they do have significant policy roles. In distinguishing between policy and vote 
seeking motives, we contend that junior ministerial appointments lean heavily in the policy 
seeking direction. 
Furthermore, Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) contend that voters in parliamentary systems 
pay more attention to easily observable events, such as whether or not a party is in a particular 
coalition at all.  Since junior ministerial appointments are relatively low visibility events, we 
expect that activists will pay greater attention to them than more typical voters. As a 
consequence, party leaders¶priorities should be more constrained by the preferences of activists 
than voters. For these reasons, we contend that parties use junior ministers primarily on activist 
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issues EHFDXVHWKHVHLVVXHVDUHLPSRUWDQWWRWKHSDUW\¶Vactivists, policy reputation and 
historically interested constituents.  Furthermore, we assume that the number of junior 
ministerial appointments a party can make is limited.  If parties could appoint junior ministers to 
every ministry without restriction, they might be expected to do so.  So long as parties must 
negotiate which ministry to assign a junior minister, they prioritize assignments to the portfolios 
most important to the long standing policy goals of party activists.  This leads us to our first 
hypothesis. 
 
H1: Parties will be more likely to allocate junior ministers on issues the party 
used to motivate party activists (activist issues). 
 
If policy goals drive junior minister allocation and appointments are limited, parties might 
also focus their appointments on those portfolios where the minister has policy preferences that 
deviate from their own. This is in keeping with research showing a relationship between junior 
minister allocation and the ideological distance between the minister and junior minister 
(Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Furthermore, coalitions are less likely 
to utilize oversight mechanisms on issues when only one coalition party holds that issue salient 
(Falcó-Gimeno, 2012).  TKHXQGHUO\LQJORJLFRI7KLHV¶RULJLQDODUJXPHQWLVWKDW
watchdog junior ministers are enforcing coalition agreements.  If junior ministerial appointments 
enforce the coalition agreement, the incentive for a party to bargain for a particular appointment 
would depend in part on the ideological disagreement between the minister and the SDUW\¶V policy 
position.  That is, when ideological differences are small, there is more trust between the 
appointing party and the party that holds the ministry.  But, greater ideological distance increases 
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the incentive to monitor the ministry.  We have argued that parties are more likely to prioritize a 
junior minister to a portfolio that coincides with activist issues. If parties allocate junior 
ministerial appointments based on ideological differences with their coalition partners, we should 
see an interaction between the ideological distanFHEHWZHHQPLQLVWHUVDQGWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶V
preferences on the one hand and whether the portfolio relates to an activist issue.  This leads us 
to our second and final hypothesis.   
 
H2: Parties will be more likely to allocate junior ministers on activist issues when 
the party controlling the portfolio is ideologically distant from the party with the 
potential to appoint a junior minister (activist issues X ideological disagreement). 
 
Data and Methods  
Our unit of analysis is the party-portfolio dyad for each coalition government. Previous 
research has used a number of different units of analysis. For example, Thies (2001) primarily 
analyzed the aggregate applications of junior ministers across countries.  Lipsmeyer and Pierce 
(2011) predicted the likelihood that a portfolio in a coalition included at least one junior minister. 
However, neither approach easily lends itself to the analysis of individual party characteristics 
and their effect on portfolio allocation. We use a dyadic approach because it allows us to test 
SUHGLFWLRQVRQWKHHIIHFWRILQGLYLGXDOSDUWLHV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRQWKHLUDOORFDWLRQRIMXQLRU
ministers.4 
In our analysis, every possible portfolio that each party in each government could allocate a 
minister or junior minister to is an observation.  For example, the Prodi government following 
the 1996 election in Italy included four parties.  For each ministry we made four observations; 
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one observation for each party in the cabinet that could have assigned a junior minister.  We pool 
data on all coalition governments from Austria (1949-1998), Belgium (1961-1998), Germany 
(1953-1998), France (1959-1997), Ireland (1948-1998), Italy (1946-1998), the Netherlands 
(1946-1998), Norway (1961-1998), Portugal (1978-1985), and Sweden (1951-1994). This 
generates a total of 9019 party-portfolio dyads for which Strøm and Müller (2000) have data 
about junior ministerial appointments.5     
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the party in the party-
portfolio dyad contributes a junior minister to that portfolio and a zero if not using data from 
Strøm and Müller (2000). In some cases, where a party allocated multiple junior ministers to the 
same portfolio we entered a value of one.   In cases where multiple parties allocated junior 
ministers to the same portfolio, we entered a value of one for each party-portfolio dyad.  While 
previous monadic analyses would have only observed that a junior minister had been allocated to 
DSRUWIROLRLQWKLVVFHQDULRRXUG\DGLFDSSURDFKDOORZVXVWRDQDO\]HHDFKSDUW\¶VGHFLVLRQWR
allocate a junior minister.  We coded each party-portfolio dyad as zero where a junior minister or 
minister was a non-party appointee.  
 %HFDXVHWKHWKHRU\OLQNVVSHFLILFLVVXHVLPSRUWDQWWRSDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVWRWKHLU
preferences for policy on a portfolio, we combine the junior ministers data with the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMP measures the 
percentage of statements parties include in their electoral platforms on 56 issues. Using the CMP, 
we operationalize the primary independent variables as a set of variables to indicate the 
principals (voters or party activists) motivating the party to discuss those issues and the amount 
RIDWWHQWLRQWKRVHLVVXHVUHFHLYHLQWKHSDUW\¶VSODWIRUP:HFRGHWKHPHDVXUHVIRUYRWHUDQG
party activist issues based on recent theories of party competition. 
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Following the logic of Greene (2012), parties add new issues to their platforms to attract 
and mobilize voters or they decrease the number of issues in their platforms to focus their 
attention on a smaller number of issues to mobilize their activists and emphasize their historical 
competencies (Green 2011; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). While parties follow both strategies, the 
conditions in which an issue is emphasized or deemphasized indicates the specific principal 
(voter groups or party activists) thDWPRWLYDWHVSDUWLHV¶VWDWHPHQWVRQWKRVHLVVXHV  
Developing a coding scheme based on this logic, we identify which issues discussed in 
the platform are supported by voters or activist groups. In particular, when a party increases the 
percentage of the platform devoted to an issue while increasing the total number of issues 
covered, we classify that issue as a voter issue. 6  We also code voter issues as those issues that 
the party removes or decreases the percentage of statements on when the party decreases the 
number of issues in its platform because the party decreases the number of issues to focus its 
attention on the policy goals of its activists. For example, if a party deemphasizes an issue while 
it is also narrowing the focus of the platform to fewer issues, the deemphasized issue is said to be 
a voter issue.  Parties remove or deemphasize issues that are less central to their policy goals 
when the number of issues in their policy platforms decrease. For each voter issue we measure 
the percentage of policy statements in the platform dedicated to that topic.  
We operationalize party activist issues as those issues that the party increases the 
percentage of statements on when it reduces the number of issues. An activist issue is one that 
enjoys increased emphasis in the platform when the party reduces the number of issues.  We also 
code activist issues as those issues that the party decreases attention to when the party increases 
the number of issues because the party adds new issues to the platform to attract voters.  This 
waters down or dilutes the attention to these issues when the party increases the number of 
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issues.  Issues that were present in the platform before the party added new issues to it are 
activist issues despite their decreased emphasis.  This decrease in emphasis is an artifact of the 
platform being expanded to include new issues. These indicators of voter and activist issues 
reflect topics the party includes in its electoral platform and the principals that motivated 
statements on those topics.  
For example, the Belgian Francophone Socialists (FS) in 1991 increased the percentage 
of its platform on issues of political decentralization (CMP code 301) from 5.68% to 7.15%. In 
their 1991 platform, the FS increased the overall number of issues in their platform. We code 
political decentralization as a voter issue in this year.  Similarly, we code political 
decentralization for the FS as a voter issue in the 1995 election because they decrease the 
percentage of statements on decentralization to 1.69% as the party reduces the total number of 
issues in the platform that year.  
In contrast to political decentralization, the FS decreased the percentage of statements on 
education expansion (CMP code 506) in their platform from 8.17% to 5.86% between 1987 and 
DORQJZLWKWKHEURDGHULQFUHDVHLQWKHQXPEHURILVVXHVLQWKHSDUW\¶VSODWIRUPThe 
percentage of statements slightly increased to 6.08% in the 1995 election when the party reduced 
the total number of issues in the platform. We code educational expansion as an activist issue for 
both the 1991 and 1995 elections. 
We link these issue indicators to ministries by coding the percentage of the platform on 
these issues that fall XQGHUWKHSRUWIROLR¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ We limit our analysis to the 13 categories 
of portfolios analyzed by Bäck et al. (2011).7 Following their logic, we attach the same CMP 
categories to the portfolios in all countries. This coding scheme results in  2822 party, portfolio 
dyadic observations in 125 coalition governments ZLWKVXIILFLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQRQSDUWLHV¶LVVXH
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priorities in countries that make use of junior ministers.8  28% (791) of party, portfolio dyad 
observations have a junior minister associated with it. Summary statistics for the variables are 
presented in Table 1.9 
***INSERT TABLE 1 HERE*** 
To test the hypotheses, we include interactions of these issue variables with ideological 
GLVDJUHHPHQW:HFRQVWUXFWSDUWLHV¶LGHRORJLFDOOHIW-right position XVLQJ/RZHHWDO¶V
logged measure of ideology. We then find the level of disagreement by taking the absolute 
difference between left-right position of the party that controls the portfolio and the party 
choosing to allocate a junior minister. The interactions of disagreement and issue type represent 
the difference between the ideology of the portfolio party with each of its coalition partners on 
HDFKSDUW\¶VYRWHUDQGDFWLYLVWLVVXHV 
We include a number of controls from the traditional literature. Like Lipsmeyer and 
Pierce (2011), we measure disagreement between the coalition mean position and the party of the 
PLQLVWHU¶VLGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQDQGLQWHUDFWWKLVGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK:DUZLFNDQG'UXFNPDQ¶V
(2005) measure of portfolio importance.  We expect that portfolio ranking increases the 
likelihood of junior ministers when there is greater disagreement. )ROORZLQJ%नFN et al. (2011), 
ZHLQFOXGHDGXPP\YDULDEOHWRLQGLFDWHSDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUSRUWIROLRVEDVHGRQWKHLU
historical party family. For example, socialist parties may be more likely to allocate junior 
ministers linked to the Labor, Social Affairs, or Health ministries.10 We also include a control 
variable for whether a party holds the minister on a portfolio. We use the conditional logit model 
to account for additional confounding factors, although it limits our ability to include 
institutional or other variables that do not vary across government parties.11  
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We use a conditional logit model to test the hypotheses.  Both the use of the conditional 
logit and our construction of the unit of analysis in a dyadic framework mark a methodological 
improvement on previous studies of junior minister allocation. Using a dyadic approach, we 
directly test hypotheses that make predictions between the ideological characteristics of each 
coalition party with characteristics of the party that controls the portfolio.  However, this also 
introduces a number of issues for the analysis because observations are not entirely independent 
of each other. To account for this lack of independence, scholars of coalition formation and 
SRUWIROLRDOORFDWLRQKDYHLQFUHDVLQJO\WXUQHGWRWKHFRQGLWLRQDOORJLWPRGHO%नck and Dumont, 
%नFN et al., 2011).12 The approach here follows the logic that the government party is the 
unit of analysis and the government portfolios are the discrete choice alternatives.13 14 
  
 
Analysis  
 We present the results of our analysis in Table 2.  In Model 1, we begin with a base 
model. Model 1 provides limited support for our first hypothesis that parties will be more likely 
to assign junior ministers to portfolios that correspond to activist issues.  The activist issue 
variable has the expected sign, but is not quite statistically significant at conventional levels.  
7KLVUHVXOWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK%नFN et al.¶VILQGLQJWKDWLVVXHVDOLHQFHLQIOXHQFHVSRUWIROLR
allocations.    This initial finding weakly supports Hypothesis 1. However, past research showing 
a major role for ideological disagreement suggests a more complex relationship.   
 We proceed with a test of Hypothesis 2 in Model 2. Model 2 includes an interaction 
between the measures of issue type and ideological disagreement between each SDUW\¶Vand the 
PLQLVWHU¶V party¶VSUHIHUHQFHV. This specification allows us to test which issues parties engage in 
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oversight activities on their ideologically distant coalition partners.  The results in Model 2 
confirm Hypothesis 2.  
***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE*** 
Including the interaction between our issue type variables (activist and voter issues) and 
ideological disagreement between the minister and the party tells a slightly fuller story than 
0RGHO¶VLGHRORJLFDOO\QDwYHDSSURDFK.  The results offer support for our second hypothesis.  
Model 2 shows that parties are more likely to allocate junior ministers on activist issues when 
faced with ideological disagreement. In particular, the coefficient for the interaction of activist 
issues and disagreement is positive and significant. Furthermore, a Wald test of the joint 
significance of the coefficients for activist issues and its interaction with ideological 
disagreement is positive and significant with 95% confidence based on Model 2. This finding is 
consistent with the evidence presented in Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011) that disagreement is an 
important predictor of junior ministerial allocation. Namely, there is an interaction between the 
type of issue corresponding to the portfolio and the nature of the relationship between ideological 
disagreements and junior minister allocation.  Importantly, the substantive impact of the 
coefficient for the interaction is positive. The effect of ideological disagreement between the 
portfolio party and each coalition party indicates that parties are more likely to use junior 
ministers on activist issues than other issues when they disagree with the party controlling the 
portfolio.    
While the evidence in Model 2 supports the logic of H2, the coefficients alone leave 
unclear an unclear picture of the substantive magnitude of the effect of each type of issues. 
Therefore, in Figure 1, we predict the change in the likelihood of a junior minister on activist 
issues for high levels of ideological disagreement with 90% confidence intervals.15 16 
16 
 
For higher values of disagreement, activist issues have a stronger positive impact on the 
odds of a junior minister, as Figure 1 illustrates. A party with 10% of its platform on an activist 
issue and high ideological disagreement with the party controlling that portfolio has a .084 
higher likelihood of having a junior minister on that portfolio than a party with zero percent of its 
platform on that issue. Although the effect of increasing issue salience is quite large, the change 
is only weakly significant for the full range of issue salience7KHYDULDEOH¶VFOHDUHVWHIIHFWLV
relative to those issues which are not salient.  In other words, appointments are driven by 
ideological differences most consistently when party activists care about the issue.  For example, 
the theory predicts the behavior of the Italian Democratic Socialist Party in 1979; faced with a 
number of ideologically distant coalition partners that controlled 13 total cabinet positions, the 
PSDI placed junior ministers on six portfolios; four of these cabinets were linked to activist 
issues: Defense, Finance, Interior and Labor. The issues attached to each of these portfolios 
occupied a ODUJHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKH36',¶VSODWIRUPLQ  
This emphasis on activist issues provides strong circumstantial evidence in support of 
7KLHV¶VNHHSLQJWDEVDUJXPHQW7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWDFWLYLVWLVVXHVUHSUHVHQWSROLF\VHHNLQJ
motives, we should expect more watchdog junior minister appointments in the corresponding 
portfolios. That we find that ideological disagreement has a stronger effect on junior minister 
allocation in issue areas that party activists care most about, suggests that the oversight capacity 
of junior ministers figures prominently in their appointment to particular portfolios.  If oversight 
were not playing a role, we might expect there to be no difference between salient activist issues 
and issues parties do not include in their platforms.   
Furthermore, most of the control variables are in the predicted directions. For issues 
parties do not include in their platform, increased disagreement between coalition members for 
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unimportant ministries decreases the likelihood of a junior minister and voter issues increase the 
probability, although the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. As predicted by 
Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011), the interaction of disagreement and portfolio rank is positive, but 
not statistically significant. ,QFRQWUDVWWR%नFNet al. (2011), we find that expectations based on 
WKHSDUW\¶VIDPLO\DUHQHJDWLYHDQGVWDWLVWLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HUR7KLVPD\VXJJHVWWKDWSDUWLHV
are more interested in controlling the cabinet minister (or do control the cabinet minister) than 
overseeing their coalition partners on these issues.  
If a major component of the portfolio importance measure is picking up the effect of 
SDUWLHV¶ORQJWHUPLVVXHEDVHGSUHIHUHQFHVIRUVSHFLILFPLQLVWULHVWKHQRXUG\QDPLFDQGSDUW\
based measures of preferences may be an alternative measure of that component of portfolio 
importance.  The effect of portfolio importance left over in the model is the underlying ranking 
of portfolio importance as it relates to office seeking goals, but that has less to do with policy 
disagreements between coalition members.  Interestingly, by directly including the differences 
between the SDUW\FRQWUROOLQJWKHSRUWIROLRDQGERWKWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VPHDQSRVLWLRQDQGHDFK
SDUW\¶VLGHRORJLFDOGLVDJUHHPHQWZHILQGFOHDUHUHYLGHQFHWKDWHDFKSDUW\¶VSROLF\JRDOVdrive 
PRVWMXQLRUPLQLVWHUSODFHPHQWVUDWKHUWKDQEURDGHUJRDOVWRSURWHFWWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VQHJRWLDWHG
position. 
 
Conclusions 
Our study builds on research on intra coalition politics by providing additional evidence 
that parties use junior ministers as a tool to constrain or limit their coalition partners (Mershon, 
2001; Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Falcó-Gimeno, 
2012).  Our findings move the analysis of watchdog junior ministers towards a conceptualization 
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that does not demand treating parties as unitary actors.  While we still rely on party positions for 
our ideological distance calculations, we distinguish between issue areas that appeal to different 
aspects of the part\¶VVWUDWHJLHV: its activists and its voters.  We add the policy demands of 
activists within the parties to existing understanding of junior ministerial appointments.  Our 
findings are consistent with studies finding that parties use junior ministers on portfolios 
controlled by ideologically distant coalition partners (Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Martin and 
Vanberg, 2011).  However, we specify the types of issues that lead ideologically contentious 
coalition partners to monitor cabinet ministers. We find that parties devote their resources to 
PRQLWRULQJLGHRORJLFDOO\GLVWDQWFDELQHWPLQLVWHUVRQLVVXHVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHSDUW\¶VDFWLYLVWV
This is especially interesting in light of Bawn and Somer-7RSFX¶VILQGLQJWKDWJRYHUQLQJ
parties adopt extreme positions to attract voters.  Our findings suggest that a party may not be 
SDUWLFXODUO\ERWKHUHGE\WKHLUFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV¶H[WUHPHSRVLWLRQVRQLVVXHVunimportant to the 
SDUW\¶VDFWLYLVWV This result complements Falcó-*LPHQR¶Vfinding that coalitions are less 
likely to use control mechanisms on issues which are tangential or only salient to one coalition 
partner.    
Our findings provide additional clarification for the watchdog junior minister thesis (Thies, 
2001).  They join a growing number of works that show a relationship between policy 
preferences and junior ministerial appointments.  If junior ministers truly have no influence on 
policy outcomes, it is strange to see that policy preferences, especially of party activists, have 
significant impact on their appointment.  However, junior ministers may serve multiple functions 
and this may lead to additional explanations for why parties negotiate for junior ministers on 
some portfolios and not others. 
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Furthermore, our results suggest that party leaders behave as if voters are less consistently 
interested in policy outcomes than are activists.  The party leaders are much more concerned 
about checking ideologically contentious coalition partners in areas of concern to activists than 
they are for areas of concern to voters.  Given that party leaders are often constrained and 
selected through intra-party processes, SDUW\OHDGHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVOLNHO\FORVHO\PDWFKWKRVHRI
intra-party groups (Ceron, 2012).This suggests that junior ministerial appointments are motivated 
more by their historical and long term policy goals as opposed to shorter term appeals to voters. 
,WDOVRLPSOLHVWKDWSDUWLHV¶OHDGHUVGRQRWH[SHFWWREHKHOGDFFRXQWDEOHE\YRWHUVIRUSROLF\
outcomes linked to these appeals.  In FRQWUDVWSDUWLHV¶OHDGHUVVHHPWRH[SHFWWREHKHOG
accountable by their own activists and historical policy competencies.   
7KHUHVXOWVRIWKHDQDO\VLVDOVRVXJJHVWWKDWE\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQWKHJRDOVRISDUWLHV¶
supporters, researchers can better understand the politics of coalition governments and their 
policy outcomes. Future studies of junior minister allocation and coalition behavior may benefit 
from examining the diverse reasons why parties include issues in their platforms. A deeper 
understanding of the party decision-making process will likely point to different ways parties 
seek to maintain their image of accountability with diverse political groups.  
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Appendix 
 
Like Greene (2012) we construct the primary independent variable, by considering the 
role of issues in intra-party politics.  We first generate a measure of the number of issues in the 
SDUW\¶VSODWIRUPE\PHDVXULQJWKHHIIHFWLYHQXPEHURIPDQLIHVWRLVVXHV(10,EDVHGRQ/DDNVR
DQG7DDJHSHUD¶V (1979) function for measuring the number and distribution of votes or seats 
parties receive in an election. Following Lowe et al. (2011), we combine the pairs of 
confrontational issues so that they represent the percentage of the platform on the issue.17 
 ENMI measures the number and relative distribution of issues parties include in their 
platforms. The equation below illustrates how we construct the ENMI from the CMP. The letter 
m refers to the percentage of the manifesto on an issue and subscript, i, indicates the specific 
issue.  For example, when a party includes two statements separate statements in the platform, 
the ENMI=2.  
   
ܧܰܯܫ ൌ  ? ?ሺ݉ ௜ଶሻ ܧܰܯܫ ൌ  ? ?ሺǤ  ?ଵଶ ൅Ǥ  ?ଶଶ൅ ?ଷଶ ൅ ڮ ൅ ?ସଽଶ ሻ 
ܧܰܯܫ ൌ2 
We expect that parties increase their ENMI to follow pragmatic strategies to attract voters 
or decrease the number of issues in their platforms to appease party activists. Actors increase the 
scope of conflict to mobilize potential supporters, but are motivated to refocus their message on 
their core issues (see for example Green, 2011). Therefore, the issues parties add to their 
platforms when they increase the number of issues and remove when they decrease the number 
of issues are intended to mobilize voters. We code issues that decrease in percentage as the 
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ENMI increases, but increase in percentage as the ENMI decreases are activist. The following 
statements summarize the operationalization of the primary independent variables where 
subscript, i UHIHUVWRLQGLYLGXDOLVVXHVLQWKHSDUW\¶VSODWIRUPt refers to the most recent election, 
and m is equal to the percentage of the manifesto discussing an issue.  ࢂ࢕࢚ࢋ࢘ ࡵ࢙࢙࢛ࢋ࢏ ൌ ݉௜ ݂݅ ܧܰܯܫ௧ିଵ െ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ ൐  ? ܽ݊݀ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ିଵ െ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ ൐  ?  ݋ݎ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ିଵ െ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ ൏   ? ܽ݊݀  ݉௜ǡ  ௧ିଵ െ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ ൏  ? 
 ࡭ࢉ࢚࢏࢜࢏࢙࢚ ࡵ࢙࢙࢛ࢋ࢏ ൌ ݉௜ ݂݅ ܧܰܯܫ௧ିଵ െ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ ൏  ? ܽ݊݀ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ିଵ െ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ ൐  ?  ݋ݎ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ିଵ െ  ܧܰܯܫ௧ ൐   ? ܽ݊݀  ݉௜ǡ  ௧ିଵ െ ݉௜ǡ  ௧ ൏  ? 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max N 
Junior Minister .175 .38 0 1 5013 
% Activist Issue 1.093 2.1 0 77.778 4321 
% Voter Issue 1.108 1.879 0 57.786 4874 
Party-Minister 
distance 
.246 .298 0 1.734 4874 
Portfolio 
Importance 
1.142 .283 .5 1.92 5007 
Coalition-Minister 
distance 
.194 .169 0 .824 4968 
Party family .182 .386 0 1 5013 
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Table 2. Conditional Logit Analysis of Junior Minister Allocation 
 (1) (2) 
 Simple Full 
   
% Activist Issue 
0.021 -0.010 
(0.255) (0.744) 
Party-Minister Distance X 
Activist Issue 
 0.162+ 
 (0.051) 
% Voter Issue 
0.057 0.020 
(0.122) (0.693) 
Party-Minister Distance X 
Voter Issue 
 0.191 
 (0.166) 
Party-Minister distance 
-0.171 -0.529 
(0.610) (0.170) 
Portfolio Rank 
0.732** 0.714** 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Coalition-Minister Distance 
-0.374 -0.523 
(0.799) (0.724) 
Coalition-Minister Distance 
X Portfolio Rank 
0.487 0.598 
(0.648) (0.577) 
Party family 
-0.271+ -0.273+ 
(0.066) (0.062) 
Minister's Party 
-1.834*** -1.829*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.118 
Log likelihood -926.685 -924.746 
Observations 2822 2822 
Note: Results are from conditional logit analyses predicting the application of a junior minister on a portfolio. 1561 
party-portfolio observations are dropped because the dependent variable is zero for all outcomes.  The models are 
estimated using a party-government id. p-values in parentheses:  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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FIGURE 1:  Predicted Effect of Activist Issues and Ideological Disagreement  
  
  
.4
.6
.8
1
0 5 10 15 20
% Activist Issue
NOTE: The graph plots the change in the likelihood of a party placing a jr minister on
a portfolio as the percent of the party's manifesto dedicated to the issue increases at two
 standard deviations above the mean level of ideological disagreement. 90% confidence
intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance covariance matrix. Predictions are
from the Logit estimates in Model 2. Continuous control variables are held at their means 
and dichotomous variables are held at zero. Predictions are smoothed using Lowess.
Change in Likelihood of a Jr Minister
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Notes 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that research by Adams et al. (2011) and others calls into question the extent to which voters 
react to manifesto changes (Adams et al., 2011; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013).  However, Adams et al.¶V
interviews with party elites also provide anecdotal evidence in support of a distinction between parts of party 
PDQLIHVWRVWKDWDUH³IXQGDPHQWDO´DQGWKHLULPSRUWDQFHWRactivists (see interview excerpt, p 372).   
2 2XUFODVVLILFDWLRQFORVHO\UHODWHVWR7DYLWV¶GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSULQFLSOHGDQGSUDJPDWLFLVVXHV6KHILQGV
WKDWSDUWLHVDUHIUHHUWRFKDQJHWKHLUSRVLWLRQVWRDFWµSUDJPDWLFDOO\¶RQVRPHLVVXHVZKHUHDs they are less free to 
change their positions on principled issues.  
3 We have no similar expectation about policy seeking behavior in policy areas corresponding to voter issues. 
4 Using our approach, the results are broadly similar to Lipsmeyer and PiercH¶VDQDO\VLVDQGVXSSRUWPRVWRI
their conclusions using a logit with clustered standard errors.  Our primary variables are statistically significant at 
the .1 level in these replications.  
5 We exclude Denmark from the analysis because they do not use junior ministers. 
6 For a formal description of how we construct these variables see the Appendix. 
7 These categories include the Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Justice, Finance, Economy, Labour, Education, 
Health, Agriculture, Industry, Environment, and Social Affairs portfolios. For a full description of the logic and 
&03FRGHVXVHGIRUHDFKSRUWIROLRFDWHJRU\VHH7DEOHLQ%नFN et al. (2011), pages 454-455. 
8   %\IRFXVLQJRQO\RQWKHSRUWIROLRVDQDO\]HGE\%नFN et al. (2011), our analysis is limited to only 5013 
observations. We lose additional observations because of the primary independent variable:  percent activist issue. 
To construct this measure we need measures of each party's platform in the current and previous elections. A 
number of coalition parties did not earn enough votes in the previous election at time t-1 to be included in the CMP 
at that point. 
9 The primary independent variable for issue salience is highly right skewed (greater than 15.8), meaning that a high 
percentage of the observations are smaller than the mean value of activist issue salience.  To account for this 
skewness, we reran the analysis with multiple alternate transformations of the issue salience variables. Treating each 
issue type as dummy variables, we find substantively similar results, although the coefficients barely drop below the 
90 percent significance level (89% confidence).  Taking the multiplicative inverse or exponentiating activist issues 
leads to coefficients in the correct direction and statistical significance at the 90 percent level. The transformed 
results are also robust to dropping the most extreme values of issue salience.  
10 The party family dummy variable equals one  for the following party portfolio combinations: conservative parties 
on the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense ministries; Christian democratic parties on the Social Affairs, Health 
and Labour ministries if there is no Socialist party in the coalition or the Agriculture minister if there is no agrarian 
party; liberal parties on Finance, Economy an Justice ministries; Agrarian parties on the Agriculture ministry; and 
green parties on the environmental minister. 
11  /LNH%नFNHWDOZHDUJXHWKDWWKHFRQGLWLRQDOORJLWLVWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHPRGHOto test hypotheses on 
the allocation of ministers and now junior ministers to portfolios.  By essentially including a large number of fixed 
effects, the model accounts for the major differences between the govern-party observations. As we discuss in 
greater detail in endnote 14, the results from alternate models with additional controls lead to nearly identical results.   
12 )ROORZLQJ%नFNHWDO(2011), we checked the coding from Strøm and Müller (2000) for minister and junior 
minister allocation against online government records from each country.  For Germany, we discovered substantial 
GLVFUHSDQFLHV:HUHFRGHGMXQLRUPLQLVWHUVRU³Parlamentarische Staatssekretäre´IURPWKH*HUPDQGDWDXVLQJData 
Handbook published by the German Bundestag: 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/datenhandbuch/06/06_03/06_03_02.html, accessed 8/12/2013.   
We also include data froP)UDQFHLQWKHDQDO\VLV%नFNHWDO (2011) exclude France because of a large number of 
coding errors in the RULJLQDOGDWD:HUHFRGHGWKLVGDWDE\FKHFNLQJWKHSDUW\PLQLVWHU¶VQDPHIURPHDFKPLQLVWU\
website and then check the party affiliation from the online archives of the Assemblée Nationale and Senat. This 
leads us to include 12 portfolios; the Ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Affairs), Ministre de l'intérieur 
(Interior), Ministre de la justice (Justice), Ministre des finances (Finance), Ministre de la defense (Defense), 
Ministre du travail (Labour), 0LQLVWUHGH/¶pGXFDWLRQQDWLRQDOH (Education), Ministre de la santé (Health), Ministre 
de l'agriculture (Agriculture), Ministre de l'industrie (Industry), Ministre de l'environnement (Environment), and the 
Ministre des affaires sociales (Social Affairs).   
13 8QOLNH%नFNHWDO. (2011) we condition our analysis on each party in government. If we treat the government-
portfolio as the grouping variable, the conditional logit drops all portfolios that do not have a junior minister 
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appointed to it leaving us with less than 720 observations in the full model. While the coefficient is significant and 
in the expected direction for activist issues in the simple model, its interaction with ideological disagreement is not 
statistically different from zero in the final model. A Wald test of the joint significance indicates that the effect of 
activist issues, the interaction and disagreement is jointly positive and significant with 95% confidence in the 
government-portfolio models. The results for models using only the government as the grouping variable are largely 
similar to those reported, although the coefficient for the interaction is not statistically significant. A Wald test of 
joint significance indicates that the coefficients for activist issues and the interaction are jointly statistically 
significant at the .1 level. We use robust standard errors in all models. 
14 The conditional logit model limits the analysis to variables that vary within the government-party observation.  
This we are constrains from using some additional control variables that do not vary across the party level in a 
government such as the percentage seats or median party status. Alternative models using random effects (which 
allow for variables that do not vary for each party in DJRYHUQPHQWWKDWLQFOXGHYDULDEOHVVXFKDVWKHSDUW\¶V
SHUFHQWDJHVHDWVKDUHVOHDGWRQHDUO\LGHQWLFDOUHVXOWVIRURXUSULPDU\LQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHV$V*DPVRQ¶VODZ
might predict, parties contributing more seats to the cabinet have an increased likelihood of controlling a junior 
minister (Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason, 2013) 
15 The predicted effects are computed holding each of the continuous variables at their mean and the dichotomous 
variables at zero. In particular, these conditions are for a portfolio ranked 1.16, disagreement of .84 between the 
minister and the coalition mean, and that is not interested in the portfolio based on its party family.  The high level 
of salience in the figure is most similar to the situation faced by the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) in 1983 in 
relation to the Agriculture Minister.  The Social Democratic Party controlling the Minister was ideologically distant 
(.38) and the PSP also dedicated 21.31 percent of its platform to related issues.  Similar to expectations from the 
theory, the PSP placed a junior minister on this portfolio in 1983.  
16 A Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients indicates that the interaction is positive and significant 
with greater than 95% confidence.      
17 Similar to Lowe et al. (2011) we combine each of the 14 confrontational codes into 7 codes using the following 
FDWHJRULHV³)RUHLJQ6SHFLDO5HODWLRQVKLSVSRVLWLYH´³)RUHLJQ6SHFLDO5HODWLRQVKLSVQHJDWLYH´³0LOLWDU\
SRVLWLYH´³0LOLWDU\QHJDWLYH´³,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPSRVLWLYH´³,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPQHJDWLYH´³(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\
SRVLWLYH´³(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\QHJDWLYH´³&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPSRVLWLYH´³&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPQHJDWLYH´
³'HFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ´³&HQWUDOLVDWLRQ´³3URWHFWLRQLVP3RVLWLYH´³3URWHFWLRQLVPQHJDWLYH´³:Hlfare State 
([SDQVLRQ´³:HOIDUH6WDWH/LPLWDWLRQ´³(GXFDWLRQ([SDQVLRQ´³(GXFDWLRQ/LPLWDWLRQ´³1DWLRQDO:D\RI/LIH
SRVLWLYH´³1DWLRQDO:D\RI/LIHQHJDWLYH´³7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\SRVLWLYH´³7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\QHJDWLYH´
³0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPSRVLWLYH´³0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPQHJDWLYH´³/DERXU*URXSVSRVLWLYH´DQG³/DERXU*URXSV
QHJDWLYH´ 
 
